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The Antitrust Bulletin/Summer-Fall2002

Transitions in IP and antitrust
BY MARK D. JANIS*

In 1973, when Ward Bowman argued that the conflict between
patents and antitrust was "illusory,"' few others took that position.
At the time, most commentators characterized the antitrust and
intellectual property (IP) regimes as adverse to one another; the
rhetoric of collision and conflict dominated the IP and antitrust
literature. 2 Today, by contrast, commentators commonly assert
*

Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
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I

WARD S.

BOWMAN,

JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW:

A

LEGAL AND

ECONOMIc APPRAISAL iX (1973). Bowman's book included "a detailed and
readable analysis of major patent antitrust problems viewed from the vantage point of Chicago school economics." LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN,
ANTITRUST 502 n.1 (1977) (proceeding to characterize the book as being
"of general interest and value," although less pragmatic than certain other

economic analyses of the patent right). See also Richard A. Posner,
Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506,
506 n.1 (1973) (praising Bowman's book as the "most recent-and a very
worthwhile-product of the Chicago school"). For a review and critique,
see Oliver E. Williamson, Review of Patent and Antitrust Law, 83 YALE
L.J. 647 (1973).
2
See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 505 ("Let there be no pretense
that the patent system is not in potential collision with antitrust: it clearly
is"). Tom & Newberg have described this view as the "separate spheres"
model of IP and antitrust, which predominated in the early and middle
20th century. Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST
© 2002 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
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that IP and antitrust share a complementary overarching vision, 3
while also noting that the respective means of implementing that
4
vision are routinely in tension.
What changed? The answer is complex, and might be given
from many perspectives. I take a patent law perspective. Taking as
a starting point the 1970s-when Bowman published his synthesis
of patent and antitrust law-I examine selected changes within
the patent system and consider how they have contributed to
bringing IP and antitrust doctrine to its present state. 5 Three patent
L.J. 167, 167-73 (1997). See also Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984) (describing in
detail the patent-antitrust "conflict" and proposing to address the conflict
via a "ratio test" requiring optimization of patent life).
3 See, e.g., Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property
Law: From Adversaries to Partners, 28 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 1, 4 (2000)
(describing as "outdated" the "adversarial" approach to IP and antitrust);
E. Thomas Sullivan, The Confluence of Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New Century, I MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 2-4 (2000)
(asserting that an accurate account of history demonstrates that IP and
antitrust are complementary). See also DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.0 (1995) (IP and
antitrust regimes are complementary). But cf James Langenfeld, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Steps Towards Striking a Balance, 52 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 91 (2001) (recent decisions concerning issues such as the
unilateral refusal to license intellectual property highlight the tension
between IP and antitrust).
4 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTEL-

LECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.3 (2001); see also Norman E. Rosen, Intellectual
Property and the Antitrust Pendulum: Recent Developments at the Interface Between the Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws, 62 ANTITRUST
L.J. 669 (1994) (attributing to patent and antitrust laws the "identical
objective of optimizing economic performance" but noting that they
"approach this objective dynamically through different policies and often

with considerably different time horizons").
5

That is, just as the starting point for the analysis coincides with

the publication of one prominent synthesis of patent and antitrust doc-

trine (Bowman's), the ending point of the analysis coincides with the
publication of a new and (hopefully) prominent synthesis of IP and
antitrust (HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 4).
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law developments seem especially important: first, a fundamental
institutional change (the creation and maturation of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit); second, doctrinal change in
patent inequitable conduct and its consequences for claims of
anticompetitive patent enforcement; and, third, evolution in the
6
infringement defense of patent misuse.
I.

The rise of the Federal Circuit in IP and antitrust

In its brief 20-year existence, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has fundamentally transformed U.S. patent law
and has established itself as one of the world's dominant institu6
For a similar effort that proceeds from an antitrust perspective,
see, e.g., Tom & Newberg, supra note 2, at 167 et seq. (describing the
transition in antitrust treatment of licensing restrictions from a regime
dominated by the "Nine No-Nos" to the present regime of the DOJ/FTC
1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property).
The 1960s and 1970s era scholarly literature on the antitrust treatment
of licensing restraints is vast. See, e.g., Harold Marquis, Limitations on
Patent License Restrictions: Some Observations, 58 IOWA L. REV. 41
(1972); Thomas V. Heyman, Patent Licensing and the Antitrust LawsA Reappraisal at the Close of the Decade, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 537
(1969); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 450 (1969); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on
Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE
L.J. 267 (1966); Gerald R. Gibbons, Price Fixing in Patent Licenses and
the Antitrust Laws, 51 VA. L. REV. 273 (1965). Concerning the antitrust
treatment of specific types of licensing provisions, see, e.g., Martin J.
Adelman & Friedrich K. Juenger, Patent-Antitrust: PatentDynamics and
Field-of-Use Licensing, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273 (1975) (field-of-use
restrictions); Wilbur L. Fugate, Restrictions on Fields of Use, 2
A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 44 (1974) (same); Gerald R. Gibbons, Field Restrictions
in Patent Transactions:Economic Discriminationand Restraint of Competition, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 423 (1966). On territorial restrictions, see,
e.g., Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Reexamination of Antitrust Law and Exclusive Territorial Grants by Patentees, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 642 (1970);
Richard H. Stem, The Antitrust Status of TerritorialLimitations in InternationalLicensing, 14 IDEA 580 (1970).
For relevant symposia, see Symposium on Patents and Antitrust Law,
39 ANTITRUST L.J. 777 (1970); Patents, Know-How, and Antitrust, 28 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 145 (1966).
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tional players in patent policy.7 Recently, through its decisions on
jurisdiction and choice of law in patent/antitrust matters, the Federal Circuit has now also positioned itself as the leading judicial
influence over the evolution of IP and antitrust.
A. Federal Circuit appellatejurisdiction
The Federal Circuit takes exclusive jurisdiction over all
appeals from final district court decisions "arising under" the
patent laws.8 A case arises under the patent laws when the patent
allegations form part of the "well-pleaded complaint," meaning
that patent law creates the cause of action or is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims. 9 Under the Federal Circuit's interpretation, once the well-pleaded complaint rule is
satisfied, the Federal Circuit takes appellate jurisdiction over all
issues in the case, patent and nonpatent issues alike.' 0
These rules have provided the Federal Circuit with broad
jurisdictional authority over patent/antitrust matters. For example,
in a patent enforcement action where the alleged infringer's counterclaims raise antitrust allegations, the patent enforcement
actions satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule and the Federal
Circuit takes jurisdiction over the entirety of the case, including
the antitrust counterclaims." This rule holds even where the
7 For relevant background on the creation and objectives of the Federal Circuit, see Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible
Supreme Court, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 387, and sources cited therein. For the
preeminent study on the Federal Circuit's first decade, see Rochelle

Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2002); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2002).

9 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Op. Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988).
10 Atari, Inc. v. J. S. & A. Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (en banc).
1 E.g., Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 864
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (exercising jurisdiction without comment over patent
infringement case involving misuse defenses and antitrust counterclaims).
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patent claims have been resolved on the merits prior to the appeal,
such that the appeal only involves the antitrust claims. 12
Similarly, because the Federal Circuit considers patent counterclaims to be sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction, 3 an
antitrust suit that draws a patent infringement counterclaim will
fall within the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. 14For example, in the Independent Services Organization litigation, the Federal Circuit took appellate jurisdiction where plaintiffs alleged
anticompetitive refusal to sell patented parts and anticompetitive
refusal to license copyrighted software, and the defendant counterclaimed for patent infringement. 5
It is not clear that Congress envisioned such a broad jurisdictional grant in antitrust matters when it passed the Federal Courts
Improvement Act creating the Federal Circuit. At the very least,
the legislative history expresses concern that parties might manipulate appellate jurisdiction by joining "trivial" patent allegations
to "claims involving substantial antitrust issues."' 16 The creation of
the Federal Circuit and its broad construction of its jurisdictional
grant have changed the institutional oversight in IP and antitrust.
When this vigorous approach to appellate jurisdiction is coupled
12
See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 701-02
(Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989) (appellate jurisdiction
proper in appeal involving only antitrust issues, where patent claim was
resolved below on jury verdict, and rule 54(b) final judgment entered on
antitrust counterclaim); Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
828 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (same). See generally HOVENKAMP, JANIS
& LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 5.2b2 (discussing relevant authority).
'3
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, 895 F.2d 736,
739-45 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
14 This assumes that the patent counterclaim reaches a merits determination. HOVENKAMP, JAN1S & LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 5.2b3.
15
Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Lit., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
16
S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981) (proceeding to
state that "[i]f, for example, a patent claim is manipulatively joined to an
antitrust action but severed or dismissed before final decision of the
antitrust claim, jurisdiction over the appeal of the antitrust claim . . .
should rest with the regional court of appeals").
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with the Federal Circuit's appropriation of patent-related antitrust
through its new choice-of-law regime, the change in the IP and
antitrust legal landscape is especially profound.
B. Federal Circuit choice of law rules

For several years, the Federal Circuit deferred to regional circuit law when adjudicating antitrust issues in patent cases. 7 In its
1998 Nobelpharma decision, the court reversed course, ruling that
any antitrust issue "premised on the bringing of a patent infringement suit" would be decided as a question of Federal Circuit
law.' 8 The court reasoned that by applying Federal Circuit law, the
court could reduce "confusion" and bring uniform standards to the
issue of anticompetitive patent enforcement. 19 This advances a
more general trend in the Federal Circuit's choice-of-law decisions, which feature increasingly frequent invocations of the view
that a given issue is "unique to patent law" and therefore warrants
"a uniform national rule. ' 20
17
See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (deferring to 4th Circuit law to adjudicate a § 2 counterclaim alleging baseless patent infringement litigation, overruled, Nobelpharma AB
v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059, 1067-68 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,

525 U.S. 876 (1998)). See also HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note
4, § 5.3aI n.7 (collecting additional authority).
18 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068. In Nobelpharnia, the Federal Circuit was reviewing a Walker Process claim. Accordingly, the precise

question of Federal Circuit law before it was "[w]hether conduct in
procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its
immunity from the antitrust laws." Id.
19 Id. at 1068.
20 See, e.g., Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, 946 F.2d 850,
858-59 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that the right to file a patent
infringement counterclaim to a noninfringement declaratory judgment
claim is "unique to patent law and warrants a uniform national rule").
In Midwest Indus. v. Karavan Trailers, 175 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir.

1999), the Federal Circuit rationalized its newly aggressive approach to
choice-of-law issues:
* * *Nobelpharna make[s] clear that our responsibility as the
tribunal having sole appellate responsibility for the development

Transitions : 259
Although the impact of Nobelpharina'schoice-of-law rule has
not yet been fully realized, both the Federal Circuit and lower
courts have applied the rule in a few settings, not limited to the
strict confines of bad faith enforcement actions.21 For example,
some courts have confronted assertions that bad faith notice
letters asserting patent rights may trigger liability along Walker
Process lines. 22 One district court reasoned that whether notice
letters asserting patent rights can be shielded from antitrust liability by Noerr-Pennington is to be decided as a matter of Federal
Circuit law, 23 on authority of Nobelpharna.24 The court did not
question whether notices deserved to be treated differently from
"conduct in procuring and enforcing
a patent."
The Federal Circuit's goal of reducing confusion is likely to
prove elusive. Indeed, Nobelpharma may spawn additional confusion. Even if courts can reliably identify antitrust issues that
uniquely impact patent law (and therefore are determined under
of patent law requires that we do more than simply apply our law
to questions of substantive patent law. In order to fulfill our obligation of promoting uniformity in the field of patent law, it is
equally important to apply our construction of patent law to the
questions whether and to what extent patent law preempts or
conflicts with other causes of action.
21
For examples of cases in which courts have simply applied the
rule to bad faith patent enforcement actions, see, e.g., Travelers Exp. Co.
v. American Exp. Integrated Payment Sys., 80 F. Supp.2d 1033, 1042
(D. Minn. 1999); Victus, Ltd. v. Collezione Europa U.S.A., 26 F. Supp.
2d 772, 778-79 n.4 (M.D.N.C. 1998).
22
See HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 11.2e (describing a split of authority on whether prelitigation activity, such as notice
letters, qualifies for Noerr-Pennington immunity). Some of these cases
have involved copyright or other nonpatent IP claims, and so did not present the choice of law issue.
23
Pennpac Int'l, Inc. v. Rotonics Mfg., Inc., 2001-1 Trade Cases
(CCH) 73,282, 2001 WL 569264, at *5 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
24
But cf Miller Pipeline Corp. v. British Gas PLC, 69 F. Supp.2d
1129, 1138 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (apparently assuming that 7th Circuit law
applied but looking to other circuit law given the absence of 7th Circuit
precedent).
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Federal Circuit law), any given antitrust claim is likely to include
at least some issues that do not uniquely impact patent law, and
thus are to be decided under regional circuit law. For example, in
C.R. Bard, the Federal Circuit applied Nobelpharma to a Walker
Process claim, noting that the fraudulent procurement issue would
be decided as a matter of Federal Circuit law, while the other elements (e.g., market power) would be decided under regional circuit law.25
Similarly, in the Independent Service Organizationlitigation,2 6
the court provided a very generalized discussion of the choice-oflaw issue: it would defer to regional circuit law on most antitrust
matters, but would not defer "on issues that clearly involve [Federal Circuit] exclusive jurisdiction," or on issues impacting the
Federal Circuit's general mandate to bring uniformity to substantive patent law. 27 Without further analysis, the court concluded
that the plaintiff's patent-related allegation (defendant's refusal to
sell patented parts) impacted on the Federal Circuit's substantive
patent law jurisdiction, while the copyright-related claims (refusal
to license copyrighted software) did not. 28
One may wonder how long the Federal Circuit will tolerate
this issue-by-issue approach to choice-of-law for patent-antitrust
matters. Perhaps the court will extend its arguments for achieving
uniformity and reducing confusion, by declaring that if any
antitrust issue uniquely impacts patent law, all antitrust issues
25

C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1367 n.7 (Fed. Cir.

1998).
26
In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 203
F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
27
Id. at 1325.

28 Given the split in regional circuit law on the issue of unilateral
refusals to license, the choice-of-law determination on this issue could be
outcome-determinative. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 4,
§ 5.3a3 (discussing choice-of-law aspects of the ISO litigation). See also
id. § 13.3d (describing the split of authority on the unilateral duty to
license issue between the Federal Circuit's ISO decision and 9th and 1st
Circuit approaches).
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in the case will be determined as a matter of Federal Circuit
law. 29 From a doctrinal perspective, this may prove to be a sensible approach. In any event, this would be the final step in a
remarkable ascendancy of a court that was not even created when
Bowman and others studied the patent/antitrust interface. 30

II. The new legal infrastructure of inequitable conduct
and anticompetitive enforcement
While the Federal Circuit brought with it the procedural
scheme described in the preceding section, it also stimulated
changes in substantive patent law that had significant effects on
the development of IP and antitrust jurisprudence. One particularly interesting example is the law of "inequitable conduct," formerly known as "fraud on the Patent Office." In the past 20 years,
the Federal Circuit has refined the standards for inequitable conduct, which in turn has resulted in sharper definition of the concept of Walker Process fraud.

29
The court took this approach to appellate jurisdiction in the Atari
case. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
30
It would also be likely to draw significant criticism on the grounds
that it contravened congressional expectations. Similar criticism has
already been leveled at the Nobelpharma rule. See, e.g., James B. Kobak,
Jr., The Federal Circuit as a Competition Law Court, 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 527, 542 (2001) (wondering whether Congress
"ever expected the Federal Circuit to have the institutional competence
not only to make broad pronouncements about antitrust policy but also to
assert that those pronouncements supplant the views of other circuits");
James B. Gambrell, The Evolving Interplay of Patent Rights and Antitrust
Restraints in the Federal Circuit, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137, 141-42
(2001). Some practitioners have expressed similar sentiments. Ronald
Katz & Adam J. Safer, Why Is One Patent Court Deciding Antitrust Law
for the Whole Country?, SF37 ALI-ABA 219, 245-51 (2000) (critiquing
the Federal Circuit's choice-of-law approach as contrary to congressional
intent and unmanageable).
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Refinement of inequitable conduct doctrine

A.

Although the Supreme Court recognized fraud on the Patent
Office as an equitable defense to infringement as early as 1933,31
and as grounds for government suits for patent cancellation even
earlier, 32 uniform standards had yet to be articulated clearly by the
1960s and early 1970s. This was true both at the regulatory level
and in the courts. Rule 56 of the Patent Office's regulations
referred to fraud without defining it, merely giving the Patent
Office authority to strike any application "fraudulently filed or in
connection with which any fraud is practiced or attempted on the
Patent Office." 33 In Norton i.Curtiss, 34 the C.C.P.A. 35 attempted
to synthesize the law in both the courts and the Patent Office en
route to interpreting rule 56. The C.C.P.A. explored both traditional notions of "technical fraud" (which included, among others,
elements of material misrepresentation, intent to deceive, and
reliance on the misrepresentation) 36 and broader notions of
"unclean hands" in equity, expressing a preference for the latter:
We have noticed that unenforceability due to fraudulent procurement
is a rather common defense. In such circumstances, we find that the
courts are generally applying equitable principles in evaluating the
3'
Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 54
S. Ct. 146, 78 L.Ed. 293 (1933).
32
Leading cases are Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434 (1871), and
United States v. Am. Bell. Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).

The rule read in full:
Any application signed or sworn to in blank, or without actual
inspection by the applicant, and any application altered or partly
filled in after being signed or sworn to, and also any application
fraudulently filed or in connection with which any fraud is practiced or attempted on the Patent Office, may be stricken from the
files.
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1967).
33

34 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970).

11 The C.C.P.A. was the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, a
predecessor court to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
36
Norton, 433 F.2d at 793.
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charges of misconduct alleged to be fraudulent. Thus, in suits involving patents, today, the concept of "fraud" on the Patent Office (at least
where a patentee's conduct pertaining to the relative merits of his
invention is concerned), encompasses not only that which we have
earlier termed "technical" fraud, but also a wider range of "inequitable"
conduct found to justify holding a patent unenforceable. 7
However, the C.C.P.A. found it convenient to analyze patent fraud
in terms of the elements of technical fraud first, and thereafter
consider whether to depart from that analysis in order to incorporate the broader equitable concept of fraud. 38
The resulting standard was less than lucid. 39 The materiality
standard was of hybrid character: in part it was an objective butfor test (materiality established if the claims would not have been
patentable but for the misrepresentation); in part, a subjective test
(materiality established if the claims would not have been allowed
but for the misrepresentation, as evidenced by subjective considerations of the examiner and applicant, regardless of the outcome
of an objective patentability analysis). 40 Similarly, the "intent"
standard straddled many boundaries: a party's knowledge of the
falsity of a misrepresentation could trigger an inference of intent;
a party's gross negligence might even trigger the inference;41 and
37

Id.

38

Id. at 794.

39 For contemporary commentary reflecting the variability of the
standard, see, e.g., Michael J. Ram, Patent Fraud:A New Defense?, 54 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 363, 380 (1972) (summarizing the inequitable conduct
test as containing materiality, intent, and reliance elements, but noting a
trend toward striking down patents for intentional fraud irrespective of
materiality, and noting that evidence of recklessness might suffice to
establish the "intent" element); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 513
n.18 (observing that while courts held that inequitable conduct required
intent, materiality, and reliance, others focused on intent and declined to
make "nice judgments" about materiality).
40 433 F.2d at 795.
41 Id. at 796 ("Where public policy demands a complete and accurate
disclosure it may suffice to show nothing more than that the misrepresentations were made in an atmosphere of gross negligence as to their truth").
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a party's subjective good faith should be considered, but "not necessarily be made controlling. 4 2- Moreover, by retaining a requirement of Patent Office reliance on the misrepresentation, the court
was requiring a further inferential leap, 43 because examiners rarely
supplied express, written reasons in the prosecution history for
44
allowing claims.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the standards for fraud
(or inequitable conduct, the label that came into more common
usage by this time period) remained in flux. The standard for
"intent" oscillated between true intent and gross negligence. 45 The
Patent Office amended rule 56 to encompass acts or omissions
carried out "through bad faith or gross negligence. ''46 Some early
Federal Circuit cases also seemed to establish that gross negli-

42

Id. at 795.

43
This assumes that the reliance inquiry has a subjective component.
If the reliance standard is purely objective (e.g., whether a reasonable
examiner would have relied on the misrepresentation in allowing the
claims to issue), the standard is essentially indistinguishable conceptually
from materiality.

"4 The court also determined that proof of inequitable conduct would
be subjected to the clear and convincing standard of evidence. 433 F.2d
at 797. That remains the standard today. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v.
Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
45
For cases appearing to accept evidence of gross negligence or
recklessness as sufficient, see, e.g., Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem
Corp., 538 F.2d 453, 461 (1st Cir. 1976) (noting that courts have required
either intent, recklessness, or gross negligence, and admitting that "the
law is not free from doubt"); Abington Textile Mach. Works v. Carding
Specialists (Can.), Ltd., 249 F. Supp. 823, 839 (D.D.C. 1965) (suggesting
that "[i]n some extreme cases even an inadvertent misrepresentation due
to negligence" may suffice, but conceding that deliberate misrepresentation is required as a general proposition).
46
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(d) (1977) (emphasis supplied), reprinted in 42
Fed. Reg. 5594 (Jan. 28, 1977). The 1977 amended rule 56 was said to be
a codification of longstanding Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) practice. Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Magnavox Co., 707 F. Supp. 717, 721
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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gence, "in proper circumstances," could sustain an inequitable
47
conduct allegation.
Today, the Federal Circuit has stabilized the doctrine of
inequitable conduct around a set of basic principles, 48 continuing
the basic theme struck in Norton that inequitable conduct ranges
more broadly than "technical" fraud. 49 The court has retained the
requirements of materiality and "intent," 50 but has eliminated the
requirement of reliance. 5' The materiality standard has undergone
significant changes as a result of PTO changes to rule 56. In 1977,
the PTO adopted a materiality standard under which information
47
See, e.g., Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 992
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (ruling that gross negligence was sufficient to prove the
"requisite intent," while "simple negligence" was "insufficient to establish intent").
48
This is not to suggest that the Federal Circuit's principles for
inequitable conduct have met with universal acclaim. For a representative
criticism, see John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the
Patent System: A Proposalfor Patent Bounties, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 305
(arguing that the doctrine does not adequately induce candid disclosure
of information to the PTO because of the difficulty of proving inequitable
conduct under modern standards).
49
E.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that common law fraud embraces a narrower
range of conduct than does inequitable conduct).
50 The court often articulates the test in three steps, under which the
proponent of the inequitable conduct defense must establish that (1) the
undisclosed information was "material"; (2) there is evidence of knowledge chargeable to the applicant of the existence and materiality of the
undisclosed information; and (3) the failure to disclose the information
resulted from an intent to mislead the PTO. See, e.g., Elk Corp. v. GAF
Bldg. Matl's Corp., 168 F.3d 28, 30 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Consistent with older authority, the Federal Circuit holds that when
inequitable conduct is established, the subject patent is rendered unenforceable in its entirety. Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 269
F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (distinguishing between inequitable
conduct, which taints the patent and thus justifies a remedy of patent
unenforceability, and litigation misconduct, which prejudices only the litigation opponent).
51

Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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qualified as material whenever there existed a "substantial likelihood" that a "reasonable examiner" would have considered the
information "important" in adjudicating patentability. 52 The Federal Circuit adopted the reasonable examiner standard as the test
for materiality for inequitable conduct purposes.5 3 In 1993, the
PTO changed rule 56 yet again, adopting an intermediate approach:
information qualified as material if the information, alone or in
combination with other information, rendered claims prima facie
unpatentable. 54 It appears that at least some Federal Circuit judges
will apply the 1993 rule 56 standard to inequitable conduct allegations concerning patents that were prosecuted post-1993,
although Federal Circuit decisions are not uniform on this point. 55
The Federal Circuit has also transformed the "intent" element. 56 As the Federal Circuit grew increasingly concerned about a
"plague" of inflammatory inequitable conduct allegations, 57 the
Federal Circuit reinterpreted the "gross negligence" cases: none
stood properly for the proposition that gross negligence alone
sufficed; rather, they established merely that evidence of gross
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977), reprinted in 42 Fed. Reg. 5594 (Jan.
28, 1977).
53 See, e.g., Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
52

54

37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1993).

51 See, e.g., Brasseler, U.S.A. 1, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267
F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying the old rule 56 standard without explanation); but cf Li Second Family Ltd. Partnership v. Toshiba
Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (recognizing the change
in the rule 56 standard and applying the standard that was in effect when
the patent-in-suit was prosecuted).
56 This is critical given the recognition that the "intent" element
drives many inequitable conduct analyses. E.g., Brasseler, 267 F.3d at
1380-81 ("Typically, a finding of inequitable conduct hinges on whether
the evidence as a whole indicates that patentees or their representatives
acted with the intent to deceive").
11

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed.

Cir. 1988) ("[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every
major patent case has become an absolute plague").
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negligence, coupled with other circumstantial evidence of culpability, could properly trigger an inference of intent.5 8 In Kingsdown, 5 9 the en banc Federal Circuit explicitly rejected a bare gross
negligence standard: "We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to 'gross negligence' does not of itself
justify an inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct,
viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative
of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a
finding of intent to deceive." 60 Federal Circuit cases now consis6
tently recite the Kingsdown standard. '
Importantly, the Federal Circuit has also expressly endorsed an
equitable balancing approach under which courts may weigh
materiality together with intent to determine whether the cumulative effect justifies unenforceability. 62 This approach operates in
some tension with the court's insistence on a high level intent
requirement, given that strong evidence of materiality and relatively weak evidence of intent might suffice to support a conclusion of inequitable conduct.
While it remains to be seen whether these substantial refinements in inequitable conduct doctrine succeed in inducing patent
58

FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 n.9 (Fed. Cir.

1987).
19 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc in relevant part).
60
Id. at 876. The court cited the C.C.P.A.'s Norton decision without
explaining exactly how it supported the newly enunciated rule.
61

E.g., GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir.

2001) ("The challenged conduct must be sufficient to require a finding of
deceitful intent in light of all the circumstances"); Upjohn Co. v. Mova
Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (same).

The court divides its analysis into two steps: "first, a determination of whether the withheld reference meets a threshold level of materiality and intent to mislead, and second, a weighing of the materiality
and intent in light of all the circumstances to determine whether the
applicant's conduct is so culpable that the patent should be unenforceable." Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
62
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applicants to be more diligent and forthcoming in ex parte patent
prosecution, it is clear that doctrinal changes in inequitable conduct have pushed changes in IP and antitrust, specifically in
regards to Walker Process claims, as discussed in the next section.
B. Interaction between inequitable conduct and bad faith
enforcement claims
In its 1965 Walker Process decision, 63 the Supreme Court
opened the door to the use of the fraudulent procurement allega64
tion as an element in an affirmative antitrust cause of action.
In Walker Process, the Court spent a good deal of its opinion
explaining that the cause of action was not a newly-minted affirmative cause of action for patent cancellation arising from the
patent laws; rather, it was a species of Sherman Act section 2 violation. 65 Recognizing such a violation, according to the Court,
accorded with "longstanding" patent law decisions that permitted
63
Walker Process Eqpt. Co. Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965). The facts and issues are well-known. The patent owner,
Food Machinery (FMC), sued Walker for patent infringement; Walker
counterclaimed for invalidity. FMC thereafter moved to dismiss its lawsuit with prejudice on the grounds that the patent-in-suit had expired.
Walker then counterclaimed on antitrust grounds, claiming that FMC had
procured the patent-in-suit through fraud, intentionally concealing the
existence of a 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002) public use bar. Notably, Walker
seemed to be claiming that the antitrust violation lay in the obtaining and
maintaining in force of the patent, not in the act of threatening or bringing suit against competitors.
64 See, e.g., Richard A. Joel, Fraud in the Procurementof a Patent,
49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 596, 603 (1967) ("What was formerly a shield,
the defense of fraudulent procurement, may have been turned into a

sword.

. .").

See also generally Peter D. Rosenberg, The Assertion of a

Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a Means of Defeating the Patent
Monopoly, 50 J.PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 455 (1968) (providing an historical discussion of cases establishing fraud as a defense to patent infringement,
and distinguishing Walker Process as adding "the right to take affirmative action" against fraud and potentially recover antitrust damages for
doing so).
65
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 175-76 (acknowledging that there was
no authority within the patent statute for a private patent annulment suit).
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the assertion of inequitable conduct as a defense to patent infringement, invalidity as the basis of a declaratory judgment claim, or
patent misuse as an equitable defense to patent infringement. 66
The Court said relatively little about the appropriate standards
for assessing the existence of fraudulent procurement for section 2
purposes. Proof that the applicant "knowingly and willfully" misrepresented facts to the PTO would be sufficient; "[b]y the same
token," proof of good faith "would furnish a complete defense. '67
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion threw a bit more light on
the subject. According to Justice Harlan, proof under the new
cause of action required evidence that the relevant patent was
obtained by "knowing and willful fraud," and that all of the other
elements of a section 2 monopolization claim were satisfied. 68 On
the other hand, it would be insufficient, Justice Harlan wrote, if
the proponent of the antitrust theory showed "no more than invalidity of the patent arising, for example, from a judicial finding of
'obviousness,' or from other factors sometimes compendiously
referred to as 'technical fraud'. "69

Commentators at the time saw the Walker Process theory as
an extension of the law of inequitable conduct. Walker Process
was the "culmination of a liberalizing trend" in judicial treatment
of fraudulent procurement allegations;7 0 it was a "modern turning
point" that "reawakened interest and concern" regarding the fraud
in the procurement theory.7 The driving force here was the antitrust
66

Id. at 176-77.

67
Id. at 177. The Court remarked that evidence of honest mistake as
to the legal effect of certain acts (here, whether certain uses would qualify as patent-barring public uses) would constitute good faith, but curiously equated honest mistake with a "technical fraud." Id.
68
Id. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69

Id.

70

Joel, supra note 64, at 599.

71 S. William Cochran, Historical Review of Fraud in Patent Procurement: The Standards and Proceduresfor Doing Business Before the
Patent Office, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 71 (1970).
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concern; 72 antitrust pulled the patent inequitable conduct theory
73
into new prominence.
Proponents of Chicago school economics saw a prominent
future role for cases of the Walker Process variety. Robert Bork
argued that the antitrust laws could make a "major contribution
both to free competition and to the integrity of administrative and
judicial processes" by addressing the general practice of anticompetitive abuse of government process-particularly, abuse by way
of sham litigation, of which litigation on a fraudulently-procured
patent was merely one example. 74 Along those lines, Bork urged
that Walker Process be viewed as more than "a mere patent decision"; rather, it was to be considered "an antitrust precedent of
general applicability. . .. -75 Bork clearly thought that Walker
Process would prove to be an important tool in contending with
72
In particular, the concern was to give private parties broad rights
to attack anticompetitive practices. A similar concern may have motivated the Court's decision 4 years after Walker Process, abolishing the
doctrine of licensee estoppel so as to free licensees to challenge the
validity of licensed patents. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).

See James B. Kobak, Jr., Professional Real Estate Investors and the
Future of Patent-Antitrust Litigation: Walker Process and Handgards
Meet Noerr-Pennington, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 185, 194 (1994) (noting the
theme connecting Walker Process and Lear).
73 Indeed, some commentators suggested that after Walker Process,
inequitable conduct allegations became more commonplace. Ram, supra
note 39, at 371 ("Since 1965 fraud on the Patent Office has become a

standard defense in patent infringement actions. ..").
74

ROBERT

H.

BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH

ITSELF 348-49 (1978). Interestingly, Bowman gave no attention to Walker
Process or the general topic of anticompetitive patent lawsuits. Like
Bork, Bowman presumably viewed Walker Process favorably. Apparently Bowman thought it more productive to direct his energies toward
critiquing judicial practices that failed to square with economic theory in
the Chicago mold-particularly, courts' approaches to the antitrust treatment of patent licensing restrictions.
7-

Id. at 353.
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the "increasingly dangerous threat" of predation through the abuse
76
of government process.
For all this, courts and commentators made little progress
in nailing down the appropriate standards for assessing Walker
Process fraud. There was broad consensus that Walker Process
fraud was, in some vague way, more serious than inequitable conduct, 77 but it seemed difficult for courts and commentators
to ratchet up the standard elements of materiality, intent, and
reliance then governing the inequitable conduct inquiry into
something appropriate for Walker Process fraud. Concerning
materiality, for example, Areeda and Turner offered an entire menu
of alternative standards, 78 running the gamut from strict "butfor" materiality to standards resembling the "important to a
reasonable examiner" standard which later appeared in the PTO
Id. at 347. The perception that abuse of government process posed
a grave threat to competition was consistent with the broader views of the
Chicago school that government institutions, rather than private actors,
were principally responsible for creating monopolies.
76

77 See, e.g., Richard H. Stern, A Future Look at Patent Fraud and
Antitrust Laws, 52 J.PAT. OFF. Soc'v 3, 4 (1970) (noting that "strong evidence" of bad faith had been required in cases to that point and observing
that mere invalidity based on the technicalities "[o]bviousness and prior
art" had not yet been successfully asserted as a foundation for Walker
Process claims).
78
PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, III ANTITRUST LAW
707g
(1st ed. 1978). Areeda and Turner proposed the following four conceptions of materiality:
(1) "obvious and indisputable sine qua non for issuance of the
patent"
(2) "the critical factor in the mind of the patent examiner responsible for issuance of the patent"
(3) "a factor that did in fact or would probably have influenced
the examiner"

(4) "a relevant and not unimportant factor in a judgment about
patentability"
Information "obviously and indisputably irrelevant to the issuance of a
patent" would fail to qualify as material. Id.
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regulations. 79 Areeda and Turner would not have forced courts
to choose one of the alternative standards, but would have preferred to employ a sliding scale, balancing materiality against
willfulness. 80
Some courts applied a "but-for" standard of materiality in
Walker Process cases, 8 ' although they also routinely folded
82
together the but-for materiality analysis and the reliance inquiry.
In either event, whether treated as a blended standard or as separate standards, applying the but-for test and inquiring into examiner reliance were difficult, and, in many cases, practically futile.
The major problem was that the prosecution history of a patent
rarely reflected, on its face, the examiner's motivations for allowing claims to issue. Conceivably, an examiner might be called to
testify whether he allowed the claims in reliance on the applicant's misrepresentations or false information, and some cases
contemplated such an approach. 83 At least one prominent patent
79 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (describing the
1980's version of rule 56).
80
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 78, 707g:

We would define "material" for § 2 purposes to include all

four cases, provided that one can tailor the definition of "wilfulness" to the importance of the misrepresented fact or, in the
alternative, that one can adopt a fairly conservative definition of
wilfulness.
See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.,
253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 274 F.2d 473
(3d Cir. 1967).
82
See, e.g., Neil A. Smith, Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a Violation of the Sherman Antitrust Law, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 337, 360-61
(1971) (asserting that courts were often lumping together the "but-for"
materiality and reliance elements, and urging that the two concepts be
81

treated as separate).
83 See American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 363 F.2d
757, 777 (6th Cir. 1966) (describing remand to the FTC to give the patent
examiner an opportunity to testify directly on whether he relied on the
misrepresentations in issuing the patent). The PTO is understandably

reluctant to allow its employees to testify as to PTO operations. and has
promulgated regulations limiting the manner in which such testimony
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scholar attacked this practice as being unlikely to yield probative
evidence. 84 Alternatively, courts could presume reliance in some
cases, or examine the prosecution history and attempt to draw
inferences regarding probable examiner reliance. 85 Predictably,
however, courts that chose to scrutinize the prosecution history
often found themselves unable to draw inferences as to reliance. 86
The standards for "intent" were no clearer than those for materiality and reliance. Generally, intent on the part of the patent
may be procured. See 37 C.F.R. pt. 15a (regulations establishing controls
over testimony by PTO employees).
84
Martin J. Adelman & Ernie L. Brooks, The Integrity of the Adninistrative Process, Sherman Section 2 and Per Se Rules: Lessons of Fraud
on the Patent Office, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 255, 272-74 (1973):
[P]roof of what the Examiner, given all the facts, would have
done years before the inquest is not possible. After all, even if
the Examiner is asked what he would have done had he known
all the facts, his response is conjectural. Another difficulty is
that there is no way to know whether the Examiner would have
been affirmed if he had rejected the patent application. Furthermore, a court cannot confidently conclude what would have happened because the record in the Patent Office may have differed
significantly from the record before the court.
85
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 82, at 364 (arguing that in cases of
"clear" statutory bars, the court should be entitled to presume reliance, on
the grounds that the examiner surely would not have issued the claims
had he or she known of the information that constituted the bar). Cases of
"clear" statutory bars are likely rare; it is not always clear whether information qualifies as a statutory bar, nor is it always clear whether that
information would anticipate or render obvious any particular claims in a
patent.
86
See SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 318 F. Supp. 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (refusing to infer reliance where the face of the prosecution history revealed no "convincing evidence" of what the examiner
would have done had the examiner been made aware of the concealed or
misrepresented facts; to determine the examiner's probable position
would have been "a matter of speculation"); Nashua Corp. v. RCA Corp.,
307 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D.N.H. 1969), affd, 431 F.2d 220 (1st Cir. 1970)
(finding no evidence in the prosecution history as to whether an examiner
had relied on an affidavit submitted in prosecution, and expressing reluctance to draw inferences regarding reliance).
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applicant to deceive the Patent Office, and knowledge on the part
of the patentee of the falsity of the applicant's representation,
were both required.8 7 But there was little guidance beyond this.
Areeda and Turner appeared to prefer a sliding scale, if it could be
reliably constructed, balancing materiality against intent such that
even "carelessness" would suffice in cases of "decisive" materiality, whereas "gross carelessness" or something greater would be
required in cases of lesser materiality. 88
Today, as a result of the evolution of inequitable conduct
doctrine under the Federal Circuit's oversight, Walker Process
standards are a bit clearer. 89 In Nobelpharina, the Federal Circuit
explained in some detail the differences between modern
inequitable conduct standards and the standards for Walker Process fraud. According to the court, Walker Process fraud is "a
more serious offense than inequitable conduct," 90 and the heightened "seriousness" was manifested in at least four ways. First,
Walker Process fraud continues to require but-for materiality, in
contrast to the less rigorous inequitable conduct materiality
standards that the Federal Circuit has adopted. 9 1 Second, Walker
87
E.g., Smith, supra note 82, at 371. I refer separately to the "applicant" and the "patentee" here because the "patentee" who faces a Walker
Process allegation might be a subsequent assignee of the patent rights,
rather than the original applicant who actually made the misrepresentation or omission.
88
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 78,
707h. However, Areeda &
Turner noted that mere carelessness might be appropriate only in the context where the antitrust proponent sought equitable relief (for example,
rendering a patent unenforceable, as in a misuse defense), as contrasted
with an affirmative claim for damages under the Walker Process rubric.
Id. 707hl n.22.

89

This is not to suggest that proving Walker Process fraud has

become any easier. Although numerous patent cases have included
Walker Process fraud allegations during the Federal Circuit era, it is
extremely rare for proponents to succeed in establishing Walker Process
fraud. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 11.2f.
90

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071.

Id. at 1070. The Federal Circuit cited Norton in support of the butfor materiality standard. The Federal Circuit also noted in passing that
91
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Process fraud continues to require a "clear showing" of reliance,
whereas reliance is no longer an element of proof for inequitable
conduct. 92 Third, while inequitable conduct and Walker Process
fraud both require threshold showings of materiality and intent,
Walker Process fraud requires "higher" threshold showings. 93
Fourth, Walker Process fraud does not allow for any equitable balancing of materiality and intent, while inequitable conduct does. 94
Whether these distinctions will prove to be meaningful is a
matter for debate. 95 But-for materiality may not be terribly different from the new rule 56 "prima facie unpatentability" standard;
"intent" for inequitable conduct hardly seems distinguishable
from "intent" for Walker Process fraud, 96 and it is difficult enough
to know what suffices for the "threshold" showings for inequitable
conduct, much less the "higher" threshold showings for Walker
Process fraud. On the contrary, the unavailability of equitable balancing of materiality and intent in the Walker Process context may
be of consequence given the usual difficulties of developing intent
evidence. 97
the PTO had promulgated a new rule 56 standard dispensing with the
"reasonable examiner" standard and adopting a standard of "prima facie
unpatentability." Id. at 1070 n.8; see also supra notes 52-54 (explaining
the transitions in rule 56).
92 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071. However, the Federal Circuit
seemed to equate reliance with but-for materiality. Id.
93

Id. at 1070.

94 Id. (calling for "independent and clear evidence of deceptive
intent").
95
See, e.g., James B. Kobak, Jr., The Doctrine That Will Not Die:

Nobelpharma, Walker Process, and the Patent Antitrust Counterclaim,

Fall 1998, at 47, 52 (questioning whether a great deal of difference exists between Walker Process fraud and inequitable conduct
standards).
96 But cf. C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1364 (asserting that Walker Process
fraud requires a "greater showing of scienter" than does inequitable conduct).
97 See HOVENKAMP, JANISS & LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 11.2c (noting
the significance of refusing to apply the balancing test to Walker Process
claims).
ANTITRUST,
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It is also unclear whether the Walker Process doctrine, and
claims of anticompetitive sham litigation more generally, have
really matured into the powerful antitrust tools that Bork and others envisioned in the 1970s. 98 Empirical assessments of the matter
would be difficult; if Walker Process victories are few (as they
are), one could conclude that the doctrine has been a disappointment, but one could as easily conclude that the doctrine has significant deterrent effect, deterring patent owners from even
initiating or threatening anticompetitive litigation.
What is clear, however, is that the dynamic between
inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud has reversed itself.
Whereas in the 1960s and early 1970s, Walker Process pulled
inequitable conduct into prominence-in a general legal environment in which antitrust concerns dominated patent-today, it is
clear that developments in inequitable conduct have pushed
Walker Process standards. For example, the Federal Circuit's elevation of the inequitable conduct standard from bare gross negligence to something more necessarily pushed the refinement of the
Walker Process intent standard to something more yet.
Indeed, it is of interest that the Federal Circuit chose
inequitable conduct, a doctrine over which it has monopoly control, to provide the relevant frame of reference for the articulation
of Walker Process standards. The Federal Circuit could also have
attempted to fold Walker Process claims together with the general
Noerr-Pennington/PREframework for sham litigation, over which
the Federal Circuit lacks plenary authority. Instead, the Federal
98

For an example of a current effort to extend the reach of Walker

Process beyond garden-variety instances of fraudulent procurement, see
In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, 2002 WL 243184 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,

2002). There, plaintiffs (generic drug manufacturers) asserted that Bristol-Meyers listed a buspirone patent in the FDA "Orange Book," fraudulently represented to the FDA that the patent covered generic buspirone
products, and sued generic competitors for patent infringement so as to
trigger an automatic stay of FDA approval for the generics. The court
concluded that the fraudulent listing, coupled with the subsequent patent
lawsuit, stated a Walker Process claim, id. at *9, and also stated a sham
litigation claim under PRE standards. Id. at *10-11. The PRE exception
seems to provide a better fit.
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Circuit in Nobelpharma shrank from doing so. Refusing to
"merge" the two lines of authority, the Federal Circuit characterized PRE and Walker Process as providing "alternative legal
grounds" for stripping the patentee of antitrust immunity. 99 Where
the elements of the Walker Process claim were made out, liability
could be imposed without resort to PRE's sham litigation analysis. 00 Whereas Walker Process claims focused on fraudulent
behavior in the patent prosecution process, a PRE allegation
focused on the bringing of a lawsuit that is objectively and subjectively baseless; the patentee's conduct before the PTO is "not
necessarily" at issue)10 '
This general phenomenon-patent pushing patent-related
antitrust-is a manifestation of the new environment of the Federal Circuit era. As the Federal Circuit consolidates its hold on
patent law and patent-related antitrust law, one might expect the
trend of patent pushing antitrust to continue.
C. Contraction of the patent misuse defense
A brief review of the past and current states of the patent
misuse doctrine reinforces the general proposition that dramatic
developments within patent law during the Federal Circuit
era have contributed to the present state of the IP and antitrust
19

100

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071.
Id.

101 Id. at 1072. The Federal Circuit may have exaggerated the distinction. While the Walker Process claim certainly focuses on the patentee's
prosecution conduct, the anticompetitive conduct of concern is the subsequent attempt to enforce the resulting patent, by threats or (typically) by
bringing a lawsuit.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit itself muddied the waters in its effort to
acknowledge the potential for applying either the Walker Process or PRE
theories to the same conduct. The court asserted that "either or both" of
the theories could apply to a party's conduct in "obtaining and enforcing"
a patent. Id. at 1071.
For a general discussion, see James R. Atwood, Securing and Enforcing Patents: The Role of Noerr/Pennington, 83 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'V 651 (2001).
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interface. 10 2 Patent "misuse" is a longstanding equitable defense
to patent infringement that draws upon competitive concerns
that run in parallel with, and may be congruent with, antitrust
law concerns. 03 The central principle underlying the misuse
defense is that equity should intervene against a patentee
who has sought illegitimately to extend a patent's enforceable
scope, usually by way of restrictive licensing practices. Writing
in 1973, Bowman identified the "scope extension" rationale
as the core tenet of patent misuse doctrine. 104 Allegations of
anticompetitive tying of patented and unpatented technologies dovetailed neatly with the scope extension rationale, and
so many leading early patent misuse cases involved tying
05
theories. 1
In 1973, Bowman saw patent misuse as a doctrine on the rise.
Criticizing courts for their inability to distinguish between legitimate "monopoly maximization" and illegitimate "monopoly
extension," Bowman lamented the apparent trend by which "[tihe
courts, and particularly the Supreme Court . . . have with increasOthers have written more extensively about patent misuse. See,
e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationalityof the Patent Misuse
Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1990); Robert J. Hoerner, Patent Misuse: Portentsfor the 1990's, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (1990-91); J. Dianne
102

Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH.
L.J. 357 (1990). See also James B. Kobak, Jr., A Sensible Doctrine
of Misuse for Intellectual Property Cases, 2 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
1 (1992).

For a brief summary of the history of patent misuse, see Hov& LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 3.2; James B. Kobak, Jr., The
Misuse Defense and Intellectual Property Litigation, 1 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 2,2-7 (1995).
104
BOWMAN, supra note 1, at 57 (asserting that "the basis of much if
not most of patent misuse doctrine" is the assumption that patentees can
leverage "a legitimate patent monopoly into an additional or broader
monopoly," and arguing that the assumption is incorrect in many cases).
013

ENKAMP, JANIS

105

See, e.g., Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp.,

283 U.S. 27 (1931); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S.
661 (1944).
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ing strictness contracted the scope of permissible patent use and
"106
expanded the definition of patent misuse ...
The scope extension rationale is still commonly employed
today. 0 71 But much of what has happened since the early 1970s
has reflected precisely the opposite of the trend described in Bowman's work-a trend toward a considerable retraction of the
0 8
patent misuse defense, both judicially and legislatively.1
In 1982, Judge Posner, writing in USM, argued that patent
misuse doctrine had arisen at a time when it was not clear that
antitrust law would have reached the full range of abusive patent
licensing practices; but with the "present broad scope" of antitrust
law, "it is not easy to define a separate role" for patent misuse.' 09
106
BOWMAN, supra note 1, at 240. See also Theodore L. Bowes, The
Misapplication of Antitrust Theory to Patent License Conditions, 10
AKRON L. REV. 39, 55 (1976) (asserting that patent tie-in's "have become
virtually per se illegal on the assumption that they serve no purpose other
than monopoly extension in inappropriate areas" and calling for a "patent
rule of reason" for patent/antitrust cases). For a less critical commentary
on relevant decisions, see Larry R. Fisher, The Misuse Doctrine and Post
Expiration, Discriminatory, and Exorbitant Patent Royalties, 51 J. PAT.

OFF.

Soc'Y 215 (1969).

107
E.g., Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001
(Fed. Cir.1986) (patent misuse "requires that the alleged infringer show
that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the 'physical or temporal
scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect") (quoting BlonderTongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of I11. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)); see
also HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 3.2b ("Patent misuse
doctrine is concerned with two basic sorts of perceived evils: the use of
patents to undermine competition and the expansion of patent rights
beyond their lawful scope").
108 HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 3.2a (noting that
after a brief resurgence in the 1960s and 1970s, the patent misuse doctrine has contracted significantly from the 1980s to the present). On the
other hand, misuse has also expanded in some respects. The opening of
the copyright regime to software has stimulated the development of a
copyright misuse theory. See id. § 3.4 (discussing the theory and collecting relevant case law and secondary literature).
,09 USM Corp. v. SPS Technology, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir.
1982). For further discussion, see, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA, EINER ELHAUGE
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 10 ANTITRUST LAW '11781 (1996).
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Picking up on this theme, one commentator went so far as to
query whether the patent misuse doctrine had become obsolete in
view of the fact that antitrust rule of reason analysis might be
employed to address the concerns traditionally addressed by the
patent misuse doctrine." 0
In 1988, Congress considered, but rejected, a legislative proposal that would have codified Posner's USM approach to patent
misuse."' However, Congress did pass legislation (the 1988
Patent Misuse Reform Act) that departed from the early 1970s per
se approach to patent ties."12 Prior to 1988, 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(d)
already had placed limits on the misuse cause of action: efforts to
enforce patent rights against contributory infringers could not
alone qualify as patent misuse." 3 The 1988 legislation added two
subsections to § 27 1(d), one of which, § 271(d)(5), provided that
tying would not constitute misuse "unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market
for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is
110 Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV. L. REV.

1922 (1997) (concluding that the doctrine is almost-but not quiteobsolete, given that proponents of a patent misuse defense are not constrained by rules of antitrust standing).
H See Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent
Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses
and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 192-96 (1988/1989)

(discussing Senate bill 438, which would have amended the patent statute
to allow findings of misuse only when a patentee's practices "in view of
the circumstances in which such practices or actions or inactions are
employed, violate the antitrust laws").
112 For an extensive discussion of the legislation and its ramifications, see Kenneth J.Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform:
"Blessed be the Tie?", 4

HARV.

J.L. & TECH. 1 (1991).

35 U.S.C. §§ 271(d)(1)-(3). For a discussion of these provisions,
JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 3.3b1(B); id. § 3.3c; see
also Dawson v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 202-15 (1980) (discussing the genesis of the inducement and contributory infringement
provisions, 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(b) and (c), and their relationship to the
limitations on patent misuse embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)-(3), all
added as part of the 1952 Patent Act).
"3

see HOVENKAMP,
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conditioned." 4 Consistent with Bowman's proposals, the legisla5
tion dispensed with the market power presumption for patents. 1
By its language calling for account of the individual "circum6
stances," it also appeared to call for a rule of reason approach."
The Federal Circuit has carried forward the restrictive trend.
Two cases best reflect the Federal Circuit's general understanding
of the § 271(d) limitations, and the propositions that the rule of
reason analysis should be incorporated into the patent misuse doctrine, but that patent misuse should not be entirely subsumed
within antitrust as Posner had suggested in USM. In
Mallinckrodt,"7 the court envisioned a patent misuse doctrine that
was not entirely coextensive with antitrust. According to the
court, a patentee could reconfigure the right to exclude by private
agreement, "subject to patent, contract, antitrust, and any other
applicable law, as well as equitable considerations such as are
reflected in the law of patent misuse.""' 8 Patent misuse would not
be defined solely by reference to antitrust violation; on the contrary, "[t]he concept of patent misuse arose to restrain practices
that did not in themselves violate any law, but that drew anticompetitive strength from the patent right, and thus were deemed to
be contrary to public policy.""19

"14
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5). The other added provision specified that
the refusal to license or use patent rights did not alone qualify as misuse.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4).

115

HOVENKAMP,

"19

Id. at 704.

supra note 4, § 3.3bl(B).
116
See Calkins, supra note 111, at 198 (citing legislative history that
appears to indicate that the entire misuse allegation, and not just the market power component, is to be tested under the rule of reason).
"1
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir.
1992). For relevant commentary, see, e.g., James B. Kobak, Jr., Contracting Around Exhaustion: Some Thoughts About the CAFC's Mallinckrodt
Decision, 75 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 550 (1993).
118 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703 (emphasis supplied).
JANIS

&

LEMLEY,
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The court in Mallinckrodt also set forth a patent misuse analysis that applied both a "scope extension" and a rule of reason
analysis to the license restriction or other conduct alleged to constitute misuse. As to the scope extension portion of the analysis,
the court determined that "[slhould the restriction be found to be
reasonably within the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject
matter within the scope of the patent claims, that ends the
inquiry."' 20 Thus, this portion of the analysis was a rule of per se
legality, if properly a per se rule at all. Where the patentee conduct exceeded the scope of the grant, the court would apply the
rule of reason:
[If] there are anticompetitive effects extending beyond the patentee's
statutory right to exclude, these effects do not automatically impeach

the restriction. Anticompetitive effects that are not per se violations of
law are reviewed in accordance with the rule of reason.' 2'
In Virginia Panel, the Federal Circuit developed a tripartite
regime for evaluating assertions of patent misuse: 22 (1) acts qual-

ified as per se misuse; (2) acts per se disqualified from misuse;
(3) all other acts. The first category is defined by Supreme Court
precedent condemning per se certain tying practices and postexpiration royalty provisions, 123 and the Federal Circuit has made clear
that it only grudgingly accepts the existence of such a category of

practices.' 2 4 The second category is defined by the specific exclu120

Id. at 708.

121

Id.

122

Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.

1997).
123
Id. at 869. The court cited Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942) (tying of staple goods) and Brulotte v. Thys
Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). The Federal Circuit did not indicate whether

it considered this category to be subject to expansion. See HOVENKAMP,

JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 3.2c (predicting that the per se category
is unlikely to expand).
124
See, e.g., Senza-Gel Corp. v. Sieffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 665 n.5
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (observing that commentators "have questioned the
rationale appearing in the Supreme Court opinions dealing with misuse in
view of recent economic theory and Supreme Court decisions in non-mis-
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sions set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 271(d). 125 All other acts are subjected to scrutiny under the Mallinckrodt "scope extension" analysis: a court must determine if that practice is "reasonably within
the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject matter within the
scope of the patent claims," and if the practice does extend the
patent scope, and does so with anticompetitive effect, the practice
126
must be evaluated under the rule of reason.
In sum, recent developments in patent misuse law reflect a
dynamic similar to that observed in the law of anticompetitive
patent enforcement: the Federal Circuit is taking the lead in reformulating relevant standards. The impetus for further evolution in
the law of patent misuse is likely to come as a function of patent
law pushing antitrust standards, a remarkable turnabout in the
short time since Bowman sought to synthesis the law of patent/
antitrust.

use contexts," but proclaiming an intention to follow binding Supreme
Court precedent); Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995,
1002 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Of course, even the "per se" category may be
subject to the requirement that the patentee possess market power, as is
the case for "per se" misuse for illegal tying. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS &
LEMLEY, supra note 4, § 3.2c.
125
Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 869.
126

Id. (quoting Mallinckrodt).

